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Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are primarily tools to achieve economic efficiency and 
do not amount to ownership of fish stocks. The 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
went a long way to establish national jurisdiction over fish stocks, and without this ITQs 
would not have been possible. Shortly after the EEZs were established, Norway and the 
neighboring countries agreed on the sharing of fish stocks in the EEZ. The road to ITQs in 
Norway has, however, been long and winding. The paper discusses the obstacles to ITQs in 
general and how they have played out in Norway in particular. Despite not being conservation 
tools, individual vessel quotas have been considered helpful in enforcing overall catch limits. 
The driving forces behind transferability are partly the capital gains quota holders can make, 
and partly the fleet rationalization that transferability generates. Main obstacles are 
controversies over initial allocation and ideological opposition against privatization and 
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ITQs: What they are 
 
Since this is a gathering not just of fisheries economists, but of agricultural and resource 
economists, I should perhaps not assume that everyone is equally familiar with what are 
called individual transferable quotas in the fisheries. Let me therefore begin with a few words 
about what individual transferable quotas are and why they are useful. Many fish stocks are 
now controlled by limiting how much can be caught from each stock each year. These overall 
catch quotas have in many cases been subdivided into individual entitlements, usually 
determined as shares of the total quota. If the quota holders can lease their quotas temporarily 
or sell them permanently (or both) the quotas are transferable. 
 
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) do not amount to property rights to fish stocks. Under 
ITQs the right to set the total catch quota is still in the hands of the government or the agency 
it may have authorized to deal with that question. ITQs do not amount to sole ownership 
where the owner of a fish stock weighs the benefit of setting aside some fish today to improve 
the growth of the stock against the benefit of catching more fish now and cashing them into 
money. Control over the fish stock requires collective action by the quota holders, but they are 
not in a position to exert any such control, unless explicitly authorized to do so, except if they 
elect to catch less fish that the total quota set by the government or its agency. 
 
Nevertheless, while ITQs fall short of fully-fledged property rights they can be very useful. 
They provide incentives to maximize the value of the fish one is entitled to catch and to 
minimize the cost for catching them. One aspect of minimizing costs is to limit investment in 
fishing boats to what the fish stocks can support in the long term. One might think that this 
would occur more or less automatically, since no one would have an incentive to invest in a 
bigger boat than he needs to take his quota. It can be shown, however, that there will be a 
tendency to overinvest when fish quotas fluctuate and the labor employed on the fishing 
vessels is paid a share of the catch value instead of a fixed wage (Hannesson, 2000). This 
system of remuneration is commonly used in the fishing industry. 
 
Hence, ITQs are primarily tools for achieving economic efficiency. For conservation, all that 
is needed is to set the limit on the total catch appropriately. Even if not primarily a tool for 
conservation, ITQs can be useful in this context as well. Individual quotas will presumably be 
helpful in enforcing a limit on the total catch, by making it clear who can fish what. 
Furthermore, transferable quotas are likely to foster a stewardship attitude to fish stocks, 
because transferable quotas have a market value that depends on how well the stocks are 
managed. Quota holders will therefore have a collective interest in lobbying the authorities for 
a resource management that preserves the productivity of the fish stocks. Some commentators 
believe that quota holders associations could evolve into resource owners in their own right, 
setting the limits for how much can be caught from each stock and otherwise be responsible 
for its management. For this to happen the authority to do this, and to frame other fisheries 
regulations, would have to be devolved to the quota holders. 
 
The 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
 
Needless to say, individual transferable quotas require that somebody has the authority to set 
and enforce limits on the total catch. The 200-mile exclusive economic zone has, with some 
important exceptions, made that possible. This concept was endorsed by the UN Law of the 
Sea Conference in the 1970s. Many coastal countries around the world, although not all, 
established such zones in the latter part of the 1970s. In some cases this enclosed fish stocks   2
within the zone of a single country and enabled that country to control the fishing of those 
stocks. New Zealand and Iceland are cases in point. Being islands at far distance from the 
nearest lands, many bottom dwelling fish stocks are confined to the economic zones of these 
two countries. It is therefore not surprising that those two countries have been in the forefront 
among nations in establishing individual transferable quotas in fisheries. 
 
But full national control of a fish stock is not a necessary requirement for an ITQ system to be 
set up. All that is needed is that the nations between whose zones the fish migrate agree on 
how much should be fished from each particular stock and how to divide it. Each nation 
involved can then further subdivide her own share of the total into individual allotments and 
authorize whomsoever she chooses to catch the fish. The rights to the individual allotments 
can be made good for whatever time period that is deemed desirable, and the holders of these 
allotments can be authorized to lease them or sell them permanently if that is deemed 
desirable. Many stocks migrate between two or more countries, and for some of them 
management agreements have been reached, but major problems remain with fish stocks that 
can be caught outside the 200-mile zone. These problems are unlikely to be solved unless the 
200-mile zone is further extended until nothing remains of the high seas. 
 
Early on, Norway and her neighbors agreed on how to share the catches from the fish stocks 
that migrate between the respective zones. The first agreement was concluded with the Soviet 
Union, with which two important stocks were shared, the Arcto-Norwegian cod and the 
Barents Sea capelin. Both stocks migrate between the Norwegian and the Russian economic 
zones. On the basis of catch history, Norway and the Soviet Union agreed already in 1977, 
when they established their zones, to share the capelin 60-40, with the larger share going to 
Norway, and to share the cod equally, after setting aside a small amount for third countries 
that traditionally had fished in the areas concerned. 
 
Agreements with the European Community took longer to achieve, undoubtedly because the 
member states needed several years to agree among themselves and formulate what became 
known as the Common Fisheries Policy. The agreement with Norway was based on the so-
called zonal attachment principle (see Engesæter, 1993). Fisheries biologists from both parties 
investigated how much of its life history each fish stock spent in the two parties’ zones and set 
the catch shares on that basis. An interesting thing about this is that the zonal attachment 
principle is not necessarily a credible solution from a game-theoretic point of view 
(Hannesson, 2006, forthcoming). That economists were not consulted perhaps helped the 
agreement, which by and large has withstood the test of time. 
 
Despite Norwegian national quotas having been determined early on for most of the important 
fish stocks, the movement towards individual transferable quotas has been slow and started 
late, and has experienced setbacks. Transferability has been allowed only reluctantly and with 
major restrictions. What could be the reasons for this? To find out, let us look first at the 
driving forces behind ITQs and the obstacles that are likely to be met. 
 
Forces for and against ITQs 
 
In the late 1970s most and possibly all the major fish stocks exploited by the Norwegian 
fishing fleet were overexploited. Overexploiting a fish stock means that the catches taken 
from the stock can be increased in the long term by allowing the stock to grow. To 
accomplish this it is necessary to reduce catches in the short term. Overexploitation occurs 
because there are too many boats and too many fishermen employed in the industry. Hence,   3
coming to grips with overexploitation requires elimination of unnecessary fishermen and 
boats. Just reducing the intensity with which fishing boats are used (by limiting the number of 
fishing days, for example) may save the fish stocks but accomplishes nothing from an 
economic point of view. Furthermore, such overcapacity constitutes a latent threat of 
reverting to overexploitation, even if fish stocks have been rebuilt. 
 
What happens if ITQs are introduced in a situation like this? Recall that ITQs are not 
primarily tools for conservation and rebuilding stocks; this is accomplished by setting the 
overall quota appropriately. If the overall quota is set conservatively, to allow for some 
rebuilding of the stock, there will not be enough fish for all boats to be fully used. If the total 
quota is not individualized, the boats will compete for the given amount of fish, which will 
lead to a shorter fishing season than necessary and perhaps a temporary glut in the market. 
This is why we have often seen an individualization of the total quota, which in fact did 
happen in Norway. But the individual quotas have not always been made transferable, and 
initially that was not done in Norway. 
 
If the individual quotas are transferable and the overall catch quota is too small to allow all 
boats to be fully used, some boatowners will be tempted to rent or to buy quotas permanently 
from other boatowners. There are always some boatowners who can catch fish more 
profitably than others, and some may want to retire from the industry. In either case we have a 
basis for a mutually beneficial transaction. There is a net gain in efficiency, as the given 
amount of fish can be caught at a lower cost, and it often turns out that it can be sold at a 
higher price as well. Accompanying this gain is a transfer of money to those who lay up their 
boats temporarily or permanently. 
 
This transfer of money has caused much opposition to ITQs, in Norway as well as elsewhere. 
Fish quotas have usually been handed out for nothing, and those who have leased them or sold 
them to others have therefore cashed in a windfall gain. What this ideologically-driven 
criticism overlooks is that this windfall gain is generated by the quota system itself and not 
taken at anyone’s expense. Those who sell or lease their quotas to others would otherwise be 
incurring costs in going fishing. The “windfall gain” they receive replaces their expenditure 
on fuel and other inputs they would otherwise be using. This is a net gain for society. 
 
Because ITQs allow for a mutually beneficial exchange among quota owners, one would 
expect the industry players themselves to be the main driving force behind ITQs. 
Nevertheless, this is not typical. The initiative to ITQs has probably more often come from 
politicians and civil servants, which is a bit surprising, since neither politicians nor civil 
servants would seem to have much to gain from ITQs. Politicians usually have most to gain 
by pandering to special interest groups, whose interests often go against the interests of 
society at large. In New Zealand the ITQ system was a part of a general drive towards 
increasing the efficiency of the economy and regain the pride of place in the league table of 
GDP per capita. In other places such as Iceland and the Alaska halibut fishery it had become 
difficult almost to the point of the absurd to cope with a much greater fleet capacity than 
needed to take the permitted quantity of fish. But in no case has an ITQ system been put in 
place, or maintained, without the support of a critical mass of the industry. Plans to introduce 
ITQs in Chile around 1990 foundered on opposition from the industry (see Peña-Torres, 
1997). An ITQ system in the Faeroe Islands was abandoned after a few years, again because 
of opposition from industry. 
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What, then, accounts for the opposition from industry? Some of it appears to be ideologically 
motivated, but may on closer inspection turn out to be based on a perception of economic 
interest. Some industry players argue for preserving open access, but in many and perhaps 
most cases these are the ones who would get little or no quota, or have got nothing, in the 
initial allocation. Crewmembers without boats are the prime example, as quotas have usually 
been given to boatowners and not to crew. These people often aspire to becoming boatowners, 
but find that difficult when they also need to buy quotas. Then there may be some who fear 
that they might be forced to sell out of the industry because of bad luck and would find it 
difficult to reenter if they had to buy their way back in. 
 
This gets us to the question of initial allocation of quotas. This is less straightforward than 
might be thought at first glance. It seems simple enough to just hand out shares in a total 
quota that are based on previous catch history. This would make it possible for the fishermen 
to go on with their business much as they would have otherwise. If the total quota is cut, they 
would get the same share as in the past, which they would be likely to get anyway. Being able 
to trade quotas allows them to get a further gain, either by selling out or by increasing their 
quota holdings. This would seem to be an example of a Pareto-sanctioned change where some 
gain and no one loses. 
 
But things are rarely so simple. Some may recently have established themselves in the 
industry with an expensive boat and no catch history. Some might have been temporarily 
absent, or caught little fish, for some extraordinary reason. Some might expect to do better 
than in the past in a competition for an overall quota. Some might hope that advancing some 
special reason, such as being a small scale operator or living in some particular place, might 
get them some extra allocation. There will therefore be fights over the criteria to be applied in 
the initial allocation. It is quite possible that the industry players will be more preoccupied 
with this fight than with the overall gain that they would collectively realize. This has indeed 
happened in a number of cases and has certainly been a factor in Norway. One vexing issue 
has been the allocation of the Norwegian quota between the inshore and offshore fleet. It was 
only after this allocation was agreed under the auspices of the Fishermen’s Federation in 
1994, and further cemented in 2001, that the critical steps towards liberalizing the 
transferability of fish quotas were taken. 
 
The Norwegian fishing industry in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
As argued above, ITQs are primarily tools for achieving economic efficiency. If this is high 
on the policy agenda, those responsible for fisheries policy might take the initiative to 
establish ITQs, as indeed they did in New Zealand. Economic efficiency was not high on the 
fisheries policy agenda in Norway in the 1970s and early 1980s. An illustration is provided by 
a policy document called a long term plan for the Norwegian fisheries (St.meld. No. 18, 1977-
78). This document listed three primary policy goals and a number of sub-goals. Efficiency 
and profitability were not among them. The three primary goals related to preserving good 
workplaces, preserving the pattern of settlement along the coast, and safeguarding the fish 
stocks. It can be argued that the first two are incompatible with economic efficiency, although 
they are broad enough to be open to interpretation. Since most fish stocks in Norway were 
already fully exploited or overexploited there was limited scope to increase the total revenue. 
In a situation like that, the only way fishermen’s incomes can continue to grow on par with 
other occupations in an economy with overall growth in productivity is by sharing the given 
income among fewer and fewer fishermen. This is indeed what has happened in Norway; the 
number of fishermen has declined almost continuously since the middle of the last century   5
(Figure 1). This goes against preservation of workplaces, although not “good” workplaces if 
the latter means jobs with incomes on par with other occupations. Fewer boats and fishermen 
would seem to mean fewer viable fishing villages. A further illustration of the low priority of 
economic efficiency was that one of the sub-goals of this so-called long term plan was 
phasing out the factory trawlers. At the time they were the most profitable of the Norwegian 
fishing vessels, and have been so for long periods after that. 
 
Another illustration is provided by the subsidies given to the industry in the 1970s and early 
80s (Figure 2). These subsidies were originally introduced to provide an income for fishermen 
on par with comparable occupations. They were initially intended to be phased out after a few 
years, but became entrenched and institutionalized through annual negotiations between the 
government and the Fishermen’s Federation. The subsidies continued to rise until the early 
1980s when they reached about 70 percent of value added in the industry. This escalation was 
due to the fishing industry lagging behind in productivity, and the subsidies were self-
perpetuating because they hindered a necessary restructuring of the industry. The subsidies 
given to Norwegian agriculture were a model for this arrangement, but one difference is that 
while Norwegian agricultural products are mostly consumed domestically the fishery products 
are almost all exported. On can argue that the electorate may through the ballot box choose to 
buy its food from expensive, domestic sources, but it is more difficult to understand why they 
would want to subsidize exports of food. 
 
Ultimately the subsidy carousel in the fisheries came to a halt (it is still going around in 
agriculture). To no small measure this was due to the sharp drop in oil prices in 1986 and the 
precarious situation in Norwegian public finances that resulted; in the years immediately 
before the drop in oil prices about 20 percent of government income came from the oil and 
gas industry, but this almost disappeared in the late 1980s. Curiously, the price of oil and the 
subsidies to the fisheries were for many years almost perfectly correlated (Figure 3). One way 
of interpreting this is that politicians spend the money they think they have, without paying 
too much attention to what it is spent on. So, in good years, more trickled down to the 
fisheries. 
 
Rather than economic efficiency, the primary goal of fisheries policy in Norway was to 
prevent the depopulation of fishery-dependent communities, particularly in the northern part 
of the country. Maintaining employment in the fishing industry was seen as a vital and 
perhaps the only possible instrument for this purpose. A policy like that faces an uphill battle, 
however. Many of these communities are disadvantaged in being small, isolated, with few 
alternative employment opportunities and much bad weather. The advances in fishery 
technology tend to promote large boats with relatively fewer people employed and with a 
wider range of actions, so that settlements in isolated places as close as possible to the fishing 
banks are no longer necessary. One likely reason why this policy nevertheless was and still is 
high on the public agenda is that rural areas are overrepresented in the Norwegian parliament. 
 
Initial development towards ITQs 
 
The development towards ITQs began in the purse seine and the bottom trawl fisheries. In 
1970, after the collapse of the Atlanto-Scandian herring stocks and the mackerel fishery in the 
North Sea, it was clear that there was not enough fish to keep all the boats in the purse seine 
fishery fully employed. Entry into the fishery was closed and, three years later, a licensing 
system was introduced. The licenses were denominated in hectoliters of cargo capacity, and 
boats could not be renewed unless a corresponding number of hectoliters was   6
decommissioned. Because large boats were more profitable than small boats, the licenses got 
a market value. Boats could be bought, stripped of their licenses, and the licenses 
amalgamated to provide a license for a bigger boat. 
 
A few years later, individual but not transferable quotas were introduced for capelin and were 
later extended to most other pelagic stocks. The quotas were determined on the basis of the 
licensed cargo capacity of the boats. The schemes applied differed slightly at first, according 
to fish species and sometimes fishing season, but soon a universal scheme came to be used, 
shown in Figure 4. As can be seen from the figure the quotas increased regressively with the 
cargo capacity, so that the largest boats were disadvantaged. The philosophy behind this was 
equalization of incomes, the large boats being more profitable than the small ones. Because 
licenses could be traded, the fish quotas became tradable indirectly through trading in 
licenses. There was for a while a lively trade in licenses, but whether it was more due to the 
attraction of getting more fish quotas or a bigger and more cost-effective boat is impossible to 
say. Figure 5 shows how over time the small boats were phased out and replaced by bigger 
boats. 
 
In the bottom trawl fisheries, individual vessel quotas were introduced in the late 1970s. After 
1980 these vessel quotas became transferable together with the vessel, and sometimes in the 
short term between vessels (one vessel could be laid up temporarily and its quota used by 
another vessel, usually but not always within the same company). The rules for transfers were 
liberalized gradually in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The crisis 1989-90 
 
By the late 1980s the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock had been depleted almost to an all time low. 
In fact the stock dipped even lower in the early 1980s, but a sense of crisis comparable to the 
one that developed in the late 1980s was not perceived at that time. There were in fact 
expectations that the stock would quickly recover, prompting some boatowners to invest in 
new boats, but the recovery did not materialize as expected and soon a new decline set in. It 
was deemed necessary to cut the overall catch quota severely. The so-called coastal fleet that 
had not earlier been subject to any catch restrictions was now reigned in. In 1989 the Lofoten 
fishery for the spawning run of the cod was stopped half way through the season, and the next 
year the boats were put under individual quotas. The quotas were determined on the basis of 
boat size; the boats were divided into classes according to length and each boat in each class 
given the same quota. Contrary to procedures in many other countries catch history did not 
matter, except that those who had fished less than a certain amount in the reference years were 
put in a special category called Group II and allowed to compete for a small overall quota. 
 
The quotas were not transferable and were in fact abandoned after a few years, as the cod 
stock recovered, but the division of the boats into Group I and Group II was retained and 
turned out to be important. Even if individual quotas were abandoned there were limits on 
how much the boats could fish. First, the total catch was divided between the trawlers and the 
coastal boats. The trawlers had individual quotas which were transferable on certain 
conditions. The quotas of the coastal boats were divided between Group I and Group II, and 
between the length classes in Group I. The Group I boats were given much more generous 
quotas than the Group II boats, so membership of that group became a valuable asset and in 
practice transferable together with the boat. There was a limit on how much each boat in 
Group I could catch, but this did not quite amount to individual quotas, because the boats in 
each length group were allowed to compete for a common quota.   7
  
The crisis in 1989-90 was a golden opportunity to reform the fishery management system and 
bring in individual transferable quotas. Usually such changes come in response to a crisis of 
some kind. The Ministry of Fisheries did in fact take the initiative to put in place an ITQ 
system and prepared a policy paper arguing for such a system. At the last minute the left wing 
of the Labor Party, in government at the time, managed to persuade the party leadership to 
change its mind. The result was a policy paper where the concluding section contradicted the 
preceding text, and the ITQ plans were scrapped (St.meld. nr. 58, 1991-92). 
 
That notwithstanding, the problems identified in the policy paper did not go away. There was 
still a perceived mismatch between available fish quotas and the fishing capacity of the fleet. 
In 1996 the rules on quota transfers for the purse seiners and the trawlers were liberalized. 
Those who bought a vessel and stripped it of its quota could retain a part of its quota for 13 
years (18 if the vessel was destroyed). The part that could be retained depended on whether 
the quota was moved from Northern Norway to Southern Norway or vice versa, or stayed 
within the area. In support of the allegedly disadvantaged north, 50% of the quota was lost if 
moved from north to south but only 5 if the movement was the opposite. The quota that was 
taken away reverted to the pool of quotas for the entire vessel group. 
 
From the late 1990s onwards transferability of quotas was gradually introduced for other 
boats, except the smallest ones (less than 15 meters). This led to a lively trade in boats and a 
corresponding transfer of quotas; over a few years the number of long line boats fell by one-
half. The boats acquired a high market value due to the value of their quota rights; in a much-
quoted case a boat was sold one day for 90 million kroner, stripped of its quota rights, and 
bought back by its previous owner the next day for 10 million (reported in the newspaper 
”Fiskaren,” November 1, 2002, p. 2). 
 
Not surprisingly, the quota rights bought in the long-line fleet appear to have been largely 
financed by borrowed money. Figure 6 plots total debt against total assets for the boats in this 
category. There is a positive correlation between the two. This increased debt has, needless to 
say, led to increased financial costs and cut into the profits that the boatowners would 
otherwise have realized through buying quotas. This has led some commentators to remark 
that the ITQs are a failed strategy, because they do not raise the profitability of the industry. 
But ITQs cannot be expected to permanently enrich the industry, nor should they. In the long 
term the return on capital in the industry will be the same as in any other competitive industry, 
with an adjustment for risk. The higher profits due to larger quotas will be translated into a 
normal rate of return through the value of quotas being determined as the capitalized value of 
excess profits made possible by the quotas. 
 
As the trade in quotas has been liberalized, the controversy about this has increased. The 
arguments against transferability are that they lead to fewer boats, more concentrated 
ownership, depopulation of certain areas, enrich those who get quotas for nothing and then 
sell out, and raise the debt and the financial costs for those who remain in the industry. None 
of this is wrong, but how relevant is it? There is no added value generated by employing more 
people and boats than needed in the fishing industry. Continued technological progress in the 
fishing industry will necessitate some decline in the number of boats and the people 
employed, if they are to earn an income comparable to other industries and subsidies are off 
limits. ITQs would, however, lead to still less employment and fewer boats; the fish stocks 
exploited by Norway are undoubtedly capable of generating some resource rent. Currently 
this rent is absorbed by excessive capital expenditure and employment; fishermen are earning   8
an income on par with comparable occupations, but some of this income is in reality financed 
by the resource rent which could be realized if fewer people and fewer boats were used. A 
number of people connected with the industry or the rural areas where it is located are on 
record for having said that this is the appropriate use of the resource rent. One wonders 
whether they have thought it through that this rent reflects value of the additional goods and 
services that could be produced by a more efficient use of manpower and capital. 
 
The new Labor-led government that took over in October 2005 put the current trading in 
quotas on hold and initiated a review of the fisheries policy. At the time of writing it is still 




Individual vessel quotas have been widely and increasingly used in Norway to avoid the race 
for fish that accompanies competition for an overall quota. On the other hand, transferability 
has been permitted with great reluctance and many restrictions. The origins of this are partly 
ideological; there is opposition to allow people to sell for their own benefit privileges they got 
for free, even in voluntary transactions between two players. Strangely, perhaps, there has 
also been opposition to having the government rent out or sell fish quotas, thus avoiding 
windfall gains to individuals. There is still strong support for a policy that tolerates excessive 
employment in the industry for the sake of keeping small and isolated fishing villages 
inhabited. 
 
Industry players were late converts to ITQs. Support for ITQs began to gain ground in the 
1980s, and pressure from industry is one factor behind the gradual liberalization of transfers 
that took place after the mid-1990s. There is also understanding among civil servants and 
politicians that ITQs promote efficiency. But without pressure, or at the minimum support, 
from the industry, it is doubtful that any liberalization of transferability would have taken 
place. The support of ITQs is not unanimous within the industry any more than it is 
unanimous among politicians. Opposition against ITQs is strongest among small scale 
fishermen and fishermen in the northern part of the country. 
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